Michael Shermer has published a brief article in Scientific American claiming that Christianity and evolution are reconcilable. The first two points need expansion, and the third one more readily explains Cain and Abel than original sin. Instead, he should have discussed how evolutionary theory can explain original sin if the desire to be like God (the Author of Life) can be linked with the desire to reproduce (to enter into the act of creation).
Points four, five and six are solid.
Ultimately, it's a good start to a case that quite desperately needs to be made. The case for evolution (though not for a purely Darwinian version of it) is overwhelming, and the evidence in its favor only grows with the passage of time. In order for Christianity to be able to maintain its claims on the truth, it must find a way to reconcile itself with evolution, not by compromising its fundamental tenets, but by establishing a framework of thought that allows both to coexist without contradicting each other.
Monday, September 25, 2006
Terrorist Threat Worse
A new National Intelligence Estimate has reportedly found that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq has worsened the threat of terrorism. Even though the report was completed in April, there is no reason to assume that things are any different now. There is also no reason to assume the report is fundamentally flawed, in spite of the recent track record of American intelligence agencies.
However, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that pulling American troops out of Iraq would lessen the terrorist threat. The terrorist threat has worsened because the invasion of Iraq gave radical Muslims the opportunity to fight the Great Satan. The fact that they have not yet been defeated gives them hope of victory, and the more attacks al Qaeda in Iraq and the Shiite death squads can pull off without bringing down the full wrath of the Americans, the greater the prospect of an American defeat looms, thus encouraging Muslims in the Middle East and beyond to side with the various insurgent groups. Pulling out of Iraq would be seen as a victory for groups like al Qaeda in Iraq and would further increase the threat of terrorism because the entire Muslim world will have seen that it can defeat America on the field of battle. The only way to reduce the terrorist threat is to win. The Iraqi insurgency must be crushed. So must al Qaeda in Iraq and the Mehdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr. Ultimately, this will mean dealing with Syria and Iran, possibly, though not necessarily militarily. It is only by defeating Muslim terrorist groups and their state sponsors and enablers that the threat of terrorism can be elminated.
However, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that pulling American troops out of Iraq would lessen the terrorist threat. The terrorist threat has worsened because the invasion of Iraq gave radical Muslims the opportunity to fight the Great Satan. The fact that they have not yet been defeated gives them hope of victory, and the more attacks al Qaeda in Iraq and the Shiite death squads can pull off without bringing down the full wrath of the Americans, the greater the prospect of an American defeat looms, thus encouraging Muslims in the Middle East and beyond to side with the various insurgent groups. Pulling out of Iraq would be seen as a victory for groups like al Qaeda in Iraq and would further increase the threat of terrorism because the entire Muslim world will have seen that it can defeat America on the field of battle. The only way to reduce the terrorist threat is to win. The Iraqi insurgency must be crushed. So must al Qaeda in Iraq and the Mehdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr. Ultimately, this will mean dealing with Syria and Iran, possibly, though not necessarily militarily. It is only by defeating Muslim terrorist groups and their state sponsors and enablers that the threat of terrorism can be elminated.
Sunday, September 24, 2006
Iran War in October?
That's what former Senate Majority Leader Gary Hart is arguing (and that it will go horribly wrong). Well that's what he's asserting, anyway. Now, Hart may be right or he may be wrong, but he offers no evidence to support his claims. It seems that we must accept what Hart says based on nothing more than his authority as an observer of things political and his sneers at those who might disagree with him.
Again, I don't know whether or not Hart is right, but it seems to me that in order to be taken seriously, Hart should actually provide some facts to back up his assertion. As it is, though, it is a matter of relative simplicity to answer Hart's assertions.
First, Hart says "It should come as no surprise if the Bush Administration undertakes a preemptive war against Iran sometime before the November election." Well, I guess that depends on what you consider a war. If you define war broadly enough to include things like the intervention in Kosovo (something Hart apparently does, given how he describes the action to be undertaken), then the claim almost becomes plausible. However, the exclusive use of air power in a military campaign has been proven to be highly ineffective, most recently by Israel's early attempts to dislodge Hezbollah from Southern Lebanon. Any attempt to bring about regime change by military means would almost certainly require some sort of ground involvement, be it special forces cooperation with dissident groups, a large scale invasion, or some sort of combination of the two in order to be successful. We certainly haven't seen anything like a large scale military build-up along Iran's border with either Iraq or Afghanistan, indicating no major U.S.-led invasion, and public support for Iranian dissident groups has been sporadic at best. This doesn't prove that the U.S. is not moving to help undermine from within the Iranian regime, but some sort of sustained display of public support for democratic movements inside Iran, as well as exposing human rights abuses being committed by the Iranian regime, would certainly be very helpful in building support within Iran for American military action against the Mullahs.
Another factor which I think makes military action unlikely is the amount of trust President Bush places in Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. He trusts her more than any of his other cabinet officials, and the fact that he has her running the State Department indicates that he wants to solve the crisis diplomatically if at all possible because the diplomatic approach leaves the situation in the hands of his most trusted deputy.
Hart goes on to say
What exactly does Hart consider to be normal times? What does he consider to be "our national character", and how does he know the current administration is not "much concerned with our national character"? Hart never says. Thus, these two paragraphs are merely rhetorical cheap shots which do not belong in a serious analysis.
Hart goes on to spell out how the attacks will unfold, apparently based on questionable reporting that unmanned drones and commando teams are inside Iran collecting and refining intelligence on targets. This may or may not be happening, but even if it is, it in no way follows that military action is imminent, and even if it is, it in no way follows that this will be the nature of the military operations.
Hart then goes on to offer a summary of what the president will offer as a defense of his decision to attack Iran. Here he actually lays out a list of facts explaining why he has taken this particular course of action with only a relatively minor cheap shot with his sanctions are for sissies statement. That is, until he asserts without any evidence whatever that the real reason for attacking Iran is that "we need the oil."* This canard has been around since at least the Vietnam War, when it was argued that the United States was involved there to control Vietnam's mineral resources.
The rest of his piece is equally unconvincing. There is no guarantee military action against the mullahs will lead to a popular uprising against the mullahs, but given the unpopularity of the mullahs and the state of domestic unrest in Iran, there's no guarantee that it won't. Ultimately, the reaction of the Iranian public to U.S. military action against various regime targets- including nuclear facilities- will depend in large part on how the United States frames its actions to the people of Iran. The president's UN speech may have been the start of an attempt to frame the military action as an opportunity for the Iranian people to overthrow their oppressors, but much more needs to be done if such attempts at public diplomacy are to be successful.
There is also no reason to believe "the age of Western military ascendancy is coming to an end." Currently, the United States spends about 4% of its GDP on defense, outspending the next seven largest militaries combined. From 1943-45, the United States spent and average of 37.4% of GNP on defense. If the United States were willing to invest such a large percentage of GDP in the Global War on Terror, the United States could arguably sustain military interventions in not only Iraq and Afghanistan, but also North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela (not that I'm advocating that in any way). The Western way of war is not being eclipsed. Rather, the West (including the United States) is simply refusing to fight as its capable of fighting.
He also provides no evidence that the goal of "sunny neoconservatives" is to become "neo-imperial Middle Eastern power." And while predictions of increased support for radical Islamic groups are plausible (especially among Left-wing groups in the United States and Europe), it is not guaranteed, especially in the long run. Support for militant Islamic groups is predicated on the possibility of success. If the United States achieves its war aims quickly, it is reasonable to conclude that, after an initial flurry of pre-planned terrorist attacks, support for radical Muslim groups. On the other hand, if things drag out, support for these groups might well increase as the prospect of victory seems to grow.
Is the United States going to attack Iran this October? It's possible, but I don't see it happening.
Would such an attack be the unmitigated disaster foreseen by Gary Hart? Again, it's possible, but there are too many variables to make a definitive prediction with any degree of certainty.
Ultimately, Hart's piece seems designed to paint the Bush administration (and Republicans in general) as power-mad buffoons, not seriously analyze the likelihood and potential consequences of war with Iran.
*Of course, the whole idea that the United States will attack Iran this October is premised on the idea that the real motivation for attacking Iran is domestic political gain. His reasoning? The Democrats might take control of at least one house of Congress in November. Therefore, the United States needs to attack Iran to prevent this happening. The insularity of this is shocking. In this view, Iran is no real threat to the United States, at least no threat talking can't solve. The only possible reason for attacking Iran is to further the president's domestic agenda. Never mind Iran's seizure of the American embassy in 1979, its patronage of Hezbollah, the attack on the Khobar Towers, its nuclear program, not to mention its diplomatic duplicity, only a paranoiac would be concerned enough about Iran to seriously consider military action. Ultimately, Hart's comments reveal more about how he and his ilk view the world. The big struggle is between those enlightened progressives who seek to build a kinder, gentler, more equal society and evil, troglodytic conservatives, capitalists and whatnot seeking to undermine them. Everyone else is just a bit player.
Again, I don't know whether or not Hart is right, but it seems to me that in order to be taken seriously, Hart should actually provide some facts to back up his assertion. As it is, though, it is a matter of relative simplicity to answer Hart's assertions.
First, Hart says "It should come as no surprise if the Bush Administration undertakes a preemptive war against Iran sometime before the November election." Well, I guess that depends on what you consider a war. If you define war broadly enough to include things like the intervention in Kosovo (something Hart apparently does, given how he describes the action to be undertaken), then the claim almost becomes plausible. However, the exclusive use of air power in a military campaign has been proven to be highly ineffective, most recently by Israel's early attempts to dislodge Hezbollah from Southern Lebanon. Any attempt to bring about regime change by military means would almost certainly require some sort of ground involvement, be it special forces cooperation with dissident groups, a large scale invasion, or some sort of combination of the two in order to be successful. We certainly haven't seen anything like a large scale military build-up along Iran's border with either Iraq or Afghanistan, indicating no major U.S.-led invasion, and public support for Iranian dissident groups has been sporadic at best. This doesn't prove that the U.S. is not moving to help undermine from within the Iranian regime, but some sort of sustained display of public support for democratic movements inside Iran, as well as exposing human rights abuses being committed by the Iranian regime, would certainly be very helpful in building support within Iran for American military action against the Mullahs.
Another factor which I think makes military action unlikely is the amount of trust President Bush places in Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. He trusts her more than any of his other cabinet officials, and the fact that he has her running the State Department indicates that he wants to solve the crisis diplomatically if at all possible because the diplomatic approach leaves the situation in the hands of his most trusted deputy.
Hart goes on to say
Were these more normal times, this would be a stunning possibility, quickly dismissed by thoughtful people as dangerous, unprovoked, and out of keeping with our national character. But we do not live in normal times.
And we do not have a government much concerned with our national character. If anything, our current Administration is out to remake our national character into something it has never been.
What exactly does Hart consider to be normal times? What does he consider to be "our national character", and how does he know the current administration is not "much concerned with our national character"? Hart never says. Thus, these two paragraphs are merely rhetorical cheap shots which do not belong in a serious analysis.
Hart goes on to spell out how the attacks will unfold, apparently based on questionable reporting that unmanned drones and commando teams are inside Iran collecting and refining intelligence on targets. This may or may not be happening, but even if it is, it in no way follows that military action is imminent, and even if it is, it in no way follows that this will be the nature of the military operations.
Hart then goes on to offer a summary of what the president will offer as a defense of his decision to attack Iran. Here he actually lays out a list of facts explaining why he has taken this particular course of action with only a relatively minor cheap shot with his sanctions are for sissies statement. That is, until he asserts without any evidence whatever that the real reason for attacking Iran is that "we need the oil."* This canard has been around since at least the Vietnam War, when it was argued that the United States was involved there to control Vietnam's mineral resources.
The rest of his piece is equally unconvincing. There is no guarantee military action against the mullahs will lead to a popular uprising against the mullahs, but given the unpopularity of the mullahs and the state of domestic unrest in Iran, there's no guarantee that it won't. Ultimately, the reaction of the Iranian public to U.S. military action against various regime targets- including nuclear facilities- will depend in large part on how the United States frames its actions to the people of Iran. The president's UN speech may have been the start of an attempt to frame the military action as an opportunity for the Iranian people to overthrow their oppressors, but much more needs to be done if such attempts at public diplomacy are to be successful.
There is also no reason to believe "the age of Western military ascendancy is coming to an end." Currently, the United States spends about 4% of its GDP on defense, outspending the next seven largest militaries combined. From 1943-45, the United States spent and average of 37.4% of GNP on defense. If the United States were willing to invest such a large percentage of GDP in the Global War on Terror, the United States could arguably sustain military interventions in not only Iraq and Afghanistan, but also North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela (not that I'm advocating that in any way). The Western way of war is not being eclipsed. Rather, the West (including the United States) is simply refusing to fight as its capable of fighting.
He also provides no evidence that the goal of "sunny neoconservatives" is to become "neo-imperial Middle Eastern power." And while predictions of increased support for radical Islamic groups are plausible (especially among Left-wing groups in the United States and Europe), it is not guaranteed, especially in the long run. Support for militant Islamic groups is predicated on the possibility of success. If the United States achieves its war aims quickly, it is reasonable to conclude that, after an initial flurry of pre-planned terrorist attacks, support for radical Muslim groups. On the other hand, if things drag out, support for these groups might well increase as the prospect of victory seems to grow.
Is the United States going to attack Iran this October? It's possible, but I don't see it happening.
Would such an attack be the unmitigated disaster foreseen by Gary Hart? Again, it's possible, but there are too many variables to make a definitive prediction with any degree of certainty.
Ultimately, Hart's piece seems designed to paint the Bush administration (and Republicans in general) as power-mad buffoons, not seriously analyze the likelihood and potential consequences of war with Iran.
*Of course, the whole idea that the United States will attack Iran this October is premised on the idea that the real motivation for attacking Iran is domestic political gain. His reasoning? The Democrats might take control of at least one house of Congress in November. Therefore, the United States needs to attack Iran to prevent this happening. The insularity of this is shocking. In this view, Iran is no real threat to the United States, at least no threat talking can't solve. The only possible reason for attacking Iran is to further the president's domestic agenda. Never mind Iran's seizure of the American embassy in 1979, its patronage of Hezbollah, the attack on the Khobar Towers, its nuclear program, not to mention its diplomatic duplicity, only a paranoiac would be concerned enough about Iran to seriously consider military action. Ultimately, Hart's comments reveal more about how he and his ilk view the world. The big struggle is between those enlightened progressives who seek to build a kinder, gentler, more equal society and evil, troglodytic conservatives, capitalists and whatnot seeking to undermine them. Everyone else is just a bit player.
Monday, September 18, 2006
For Their Next Trick
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will show that Iran has no ties to Hezbollah.
In the meantime, though, Stephen Hayes cuts through all of the smoke and mirrors of the Committee's report on Iraq-al Qaeda connections. He effectively shows the report to be a hack-job, and a poor one at that.
Democrats love to accuse the president of manipulating intelligence to make the case for invading Iraq. I guess all I can say is see Matthew 7:3-5.
In the meantime, though, Stephen Hayes cuts through all of the smoke and mirrors of the Committee's report on Iraq-al Qaeda connections. He effectively shows the report to be a hack-job, and a poor one at that.
Democrats love to accuse the president of manipulating intelligence to make the case for invading Iraq. I guess all I can say is see Matthew 7:3-5.
Different Understandings of God's Nature
Here is the portion of Benedict XVI's speech at Regensburg concerning Islam:
It seems to me that difference between the Christian understanding of God's nature and Islam's is at the root of the differences between Christian and Muslim reaction to perceived insults. For both the Christian and the Muslim, God is the source of all truth. However, the similarities end there. For the Christian, God is inherently rational, His creation reflects that rationality, and reason is His gift to man- whom He has created in His image and likeness- so that he may come to know the truth. For the Muslim, God is entirely transcendant, and it is thus impossible to know the truth, save by divine revelation. Because of this, it falls upon any given Muslim to defend his faith by whatever means is at his disposal. If he can answer a criticism of Islam or overcome an argument against it by force of reason, he may certainly do so, but if that is not an option for him, it is justified to oppose the criticism or argument with violence because it must necessarily be sophistry, and thus a threat to those Muslims who might be tempted away from Islam by it. However, such behavior also casts severe doubt on Islam's claims to the truth in the eyes of rationalists.
I was reminded of all this recently, when I read the edition by professor Theodore Khoury (Muenster) of part of the dialogue carried on -- perhaps in 1391 in the winter barracks near Ankara -- by the erudite Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus and an educated Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth of both.Here then, the Pope illustrates a fundamental difference between Christianity and Islam, and it is very interesting to see how this has been reflected in the reaction of the "Muslim street." Whereas Christians respond to statements deemed to be anti-Christian with argument (if they see fit to respond at all) and any violence or the threat of violence is condemned, the first reaction of the Muslim world is to riot, firebomb churches, kill nuns and threaten the Pope himself with violence. This same thing was also evident in the Danish cartoon controversy, when the first reaction of Muslims was to riot and threaten death to anyone who published the cartoons, as opposed to explaining why the cartoons were a slander against Islam and Mohammed in particular.
It was probably the emperor himself who set down this dialogue, during the siege of Constantinople between 1394 and 1402; and this would explain why his arguments are given in greater detail than the responses of the learned Persian. The dialogue ranges widely over the structures of faith contained in the Bible and in the Koran, and deals especially with the image of God and of man, while necessarily returning repeatedly to the relationship of the "three Laws": the Old Testament, the New Testament and the Koran.
In this lecture I would like to discuss only one point -- itself rather marginal to the dialogue itself -- which, in the context of the issue of "faith and reason," I found interesting and which can serve as the starting point for my reflections on this issue.
In the seventh conversation ("diálesis" -- controversy) edited by professor Khoury, the emperor touches on the theme of the jihad (holy war). The emperor must have known that sura 2:256 reads: "There is no compulsion in religion." It is one of the suras of the early period, when Mohammed was still powerless and under [threat]. But naturally the emperor also knew the instructions, developed later and recorded in the Koran, concerning holy war.
Without descending to details, such as the difference in treatment accorded to those who have the "Book" and the "infidels," he turns to his interlocutor somewhat brusquely with the central question on the relationship between religion and violence in general, in these words: "Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached."
The emperor goes on to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the faith through violence is something unreasonable. Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul. "God is not pleased by blood, and not acting reasonably ("syn logo") is contrary to God's nature. Faith is born of the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats.... To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or any other means of threatening a person with death...."
The decisive statement in this argument against violent conversion is this: Not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God's nature. The editor, Theodore Khoury, observes: For the emperor, as a Byzantine shaped by Greek philosophy, this statement is self-evident. But for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality. Here Khoury quotes a work of the noted French Islamist R. Arnaldez, who points out that Ibn Hazn went so far as to state that God is not bound even by his own word, and that nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us. Were it God's will, we would even have to practice idolatry.
It seems to me that difference between the Christian understanding of God's nature and Islam's is at the root of the differences between Christian and Muslim reaction to perceived insults. For both the Christian and the Muslim, God is the source of all truth. However, the similarities end there. For the Christian, God is inherently rational, His creation reflects that rationality, and reason is His gift to man- whom He has created in His image and likeness- so that he may come to know the truth. For the Muslim, God is entirely transcendant, and it is thus impossible to know the truth, save by divine revelation. Because of this, it falls upon any given Muslim to defend his faith by whatever means is at his disposal. If he can answer a criticism of Islam or overcome an argument against it by force of reason, he may certainly do so, but if that is not an option for him, it is justified to oppose the criticism or argument with violence because it must necessarily be sophistry, and thus a threat to those Muslims who might be tempted away from Islam by it. However, such behavior also casts severe doubt on Islam's claims to the truth in the eyes of rationalists.
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