Again, I don't know whether or not Hart is right, but it seems to me that in order to be taken seriously, Hart should actually provide some facts to back up his assertion. As it is, though, it is a matter of relative simplicity to answer Hart's assertions.
First, Hart says "It should come as no surprise if the Bush Administration undertakes a preemptive war against Iran sometime before the November election." Well, I guess that depends on what you consider a war. If you define war broadly enough to include things like the intervention in Kosovo (something Hart apparently does, given how he describes the action to be undertaken), then the claim almost becomes plausible. However, the exclusive use of air power in a military campaign has been proven to be highly ineffective, most recently by Israel's early attempts to dislodge Hezbollah from Southern Lebanon. Any attempt to bring about regime change by military means would almost certainly require some sort of ground involvement, be it special forces cooperation with dissident groups, a large scale invasion, or some sort of combination of the two in order to be successful. We certainly haven't seen anything like a large scale military build-up along Iran's border with either Iraq or Afghanistan, indicating no major U.S.-led invasion, and public support for Iranian dissident groups has been sporadic at best. This doesn't prove that the U.S. is not moving to help undermine from within the Iranian regime, but some sort of sustained display of public support for democratic movements inside Iran, as well as exposing human rights abuses being committed by the Iranian regime, would certainly be very helpful in building support within Iran for American military action against the Mullahs.
Another factor which I think makes military action unlikely is the amount of trust President Bush places in Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. He trusts her more than any of his other cabinet officials, and the fact that he has her running the State Department indicates that he wants to solve the crisis diplomatically if at all possible because the diplomatic approach leaves the situation in the hands of his most trusted deputy.
Hart goes on to say
Were these more normal times, this would be a stunning possibility, quickly dismissed by thoughtful people as dangerous, unprovoked, and out of keeping with our national character. But we do not live in normal times.
And we do not have a government much concerned with our national character. If anything, our current Administration is out to remake our national character into something it has never been.
What exactly does Hart consider to be normal times? What does he consider to be "our national character", and how does he know the current administration is not "much concerned with our national character"? Hart never says. Thus, these two paragraphs are merely rhetorical cheap shots which do not belong in a serious analysis.
Hart goes on to spell out how the attacks will unfold, apparently based on questionable reporting that unmanned drones and commando teams are inside Iran collecting and refining intelligence on targets. This may or may not be happening, but even if it is, it in no way follows that military action is imminent, and even if it is, it in no way follows that this will be the nature of the military operations.
Hart then goes on to offer a summary of what the president will offer as a defense of his decision to attack Iran. Here he actually lays out a list of facts explaining why he has taken this particular course of action with only a relatively minor cheap shot with his sanctions are for sissies statement. That is, until he asserts without any evidence whatever that the real reason for attacking Iran is that "we need the oil."* This canard has been around since at least the Vietnam War, when it was argued that the United States was involved there to control Vietnam's mineral resources.
The rest of his piece is equally unconvincing. There is no guarantee military action against the mullahs will lead to a popular uprising against the mullahs, but given the unpopularity of the mullahs and the state of domestic unrest in Iran, there's no guarantee that it won't. Ultimately, the reaction of the Iranian public to U.S. military action against various regime targets- including nuclear facilities- will depend in large part on how the United States frames its actions to the people of Iran. The president's UN speech may have been the start of an attempt to frame the military action as an opportunity for the Iranian people to overthrow their oppressors, but much more needs to be done if such attempts at public diplomacy are to be successful.
There is also no reason to believe "the age of Western military ascendancy is coming to an end." Currently, the United States spends about 4% of its GDP on defense, outspending the next seven largest militaries combined. From 1943-45, the United States spent and average of 37.4% of GNP on defense. If the United States were willing to invest such a large percentage of GDP in the Global War on Terror, the United States could arguably sustain military interventions in not only Iraq and Afghanistan, but also North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela (not that I'm advocating that in any way). The Western way of war is not being eclipsed. Rather, the West (including the United States) is simply refusing to fight as its capable of fighting.
He also provides no evidence that the goal of "sunny neoconservatives" is to become "neo-imperial Middle Eastern power." And while predictions of increased support for radical Islamic groups are plausible (especially among Left-wing groups in the United States and Europe), it is not guaranteed, especially in the long run. Support for militant Islamic groups is predicated on the possibility of success. If the United States achieves its war aims quickly, it is reasonable to conclude that, after an initial flurry of pre-planned terrorist attacks, support for radical Muslim groups. On the other hand, if things drag out, support for these groups might well increase as the prospect of victory seems to grow.
Is the United States going to attack Iran this October? It's possible, but I don't see it happening.
Would such an attack be the unmitigated disaster foreseen by Gary Hart? Again, it's possible, but there are too many variables to make a definitive prediction with any degree of certainty.
Ultimately, Hart's piece seems designed to paint the Bush administration (and Republicans in general) as power-mad buffoons, not seriously analyze the likelihood and potential consequences of war with Iran.
*Of course, the whole idea that the United States will attack Iran this October is premised on the idea that the real motivation for attacking Iran is domestic political gain. His reasoning? The Democrats might take control of at least one house of Congress in November. Therefore, the United States needs to attack Iran to prevent this happening. The insularity of this is shocking. In this view, Iran is no real threat to the United States, at least no threat talking can't solve. The only possible reason for attacking Iran is to further the president's domestic agenda. Never mind Iran's seizure of the American embassy in 1979, its patronage of Hezbollah, the attack on the Khobar Towers, its nuclear program, not to mention its diplomatic duplicity, only a paranoiac would be concerned enough about Iran to seriously consider military action. Ultimately, Hart's comments reveal more about how he and his ilk view the world. The big struggle is between those enlightened progressives who seek to build a kinder, gentler, more equal society and evil, troglodytic conservatives, capitalists and whatnot seeking to undermine them. Everyone else is just a bit player.
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